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Introduction
It is estimated that more than 25 million Americans, including 7 million children, suffer from asthma, and that that number has been steadily increasing since 2000 (Akinbami et al., 2012) . One important contributor to this increase is exposure to air pollution (e.g. Pénard-Morand et al. (2010) ). There is indeed a large body of literature on the negative impacts of air pollution on health (e.g. Greenstone (2004) , Chay & Greenstone (2005) , Dominici et al. (2014) ). Although air pollution is strictly regulated in the U.S. under the Clean Air Act, we observe substantial variability across states and such variation is likely influenced by the states' political environment (Potoski & Woods, 2002) . In particular, the identity of the party in power is likely to have a significant influence as it has been shown to affect economic activity, policies, spending, and the labor market (e.g. Besley & Case (1995 , Leigh (2008) and Beland (2015) ). Party affiliation is then likely to contribute to the realized levels of air pollution.
In this paper, we estimate the causal impact of party affiliation (Democrat or Republican) on the states' levels of five major air pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), ground-level ozone (Ozone), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), particulate matters (Particulates) 1 and sulfur dioxide (SO2). We find that the concentrations of nitrogen dioxide, ground-level Ozone and particulate matters are significantly lower under Democratic governors. We find no influence of party affiliation on the levels of the other pollutants. Interestingly, we find that changes in the levels mostly happen below EPA standards.
We further investigate the likely channels through which party affiliation affects the concentration of pollutants. Using dummy variables for major regulation changes for nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide, we argue that frequent changes in the regulation of nitrogen dioxide explain a significant portion of our results. This is in agreement with Hansjürgens (2011) who argues that regulatory uncertainty may have significant negative impacts on the efficiency of NO2 and SO2 markets.
1 Technical definition: PM10 Total 0-10um STP 1 This paper contributes to the growing literature linking politics and the environment (e.g. Fredriksson & Neumayer (2013) , Bianchini & Revelli (2013) , Cremer et al. (2008) ).
Our results complement the literature's fndings that the election of Democratic (or leftcentrist, see Garmann (2014) ) politicians have a positive impact on the environment. Fredriksson & Wollscheid (2010) find that party discipline, strength, and political instability are strong determinants of policy outcomes, while List & Sturm (2006) argues that policies are largely influenced by lobbying and finds a strong link between electoral incentives and environmental policies. Innes & Mitra (2015) find that new Republican representatives significantly depress inspection rates in the year following their election.
We contribute to this literature by estimating the causal impact of party affiliation of U.S. governors on the actual levels of air pollutants. Our analysis suggests that party affiliation has a significant impact on the quality of life as measured by the concentration of air pollutants, and that this impact is mostly a result of policy choices. In addition to the obvious health consequences, our focus on the actual environmental measures (as opposed to environmental policies) is also motivated by the recent literature linking air quality to happiness (Levinson, 2012) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the data and discuss historical trends and context. In section 3, we present our methodology. In section 4, we present our results. In section 5, we present robustness checks. We conclude in section 6. 
Background Information and Historical Trends
We concentrate on five pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), ground-Level ozone (Ozone), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), particulate matter (Particulate) and sulfur dioxide (SO2). In this section, we briefly describe each of these pollutants, their main effects on health, and their historical trends. 3
Three pollutants are directly emitted as a result of human activities: CO, NO2 and SO2. Carbon monoxide is emitted mostly from combustion of mobile (cars, trucks, etc.) sources and fires. It affects health mostly by reducing oxygen delivery to the organs and tissues. Nitrogen dioxide is also produced as a result of combustion, principally from mobile sources, fires, and industrial processes. Direct health effects of NO2 include inflammation of the respiratory system and asthma. NO2 also contributes to the formation of ground-level ozone, particulate pollution (see below), and acid rain. Sulfur dioxide is emitted from the combustion of fossil fuels, mostly from power plants. SO2's main direct effects on health are also related to the respiratory system. SO2 also has indirect effects on health as it contributes to the formation of particulate matter and acid rain.
The two remaining pollutants, ground-level ozone and particulate matters, are not directly emitted and are the result of the interactions between other pollutants. Ozone is formed by the interaction between nitrite oxides (including NO2) and volatile organic compounds (from organic chemicals, present in household products, paint, etc.). Ozone mostly affects individuals with lung diseases. Children and the elderly are also particularly sensitive to Ozone. Particulate matters represent a mixture of a large variety of chemicals, dust, and acids. The effects of particulate matters on health are wide and depend on the size of the particulates. Smaller particulates (on which this paper focusses) have the strongest impact on health, contributing (among many others) to lung diseases, non-fatal heart attacks, and asthma.
Over the years the concentrations of those five pollutants have been steadily decreasing (see Figure 4) . A likely contributor to that decrease is the Clean Air Act (established in 1970 with major amendments in 1977 and 1990) which requires the EPA to establish quality standards for six major pollutants (including the five pollutants studied here as well as lead). Although states are required to adopt strategies in order to meet those quality standards, implementation is highly heterogeneous across states and pollutants. We shall see that this heterogeneity in implementation has a measurable impact on the concentration levels, and can be (at least partly) explained by states' political dynamics.
Methodology
We capture the causal impact of the party allegiance of governors on air quality using a regression discontinuity design (RDD), following the work of Lee (2001 Lee ( , 2008 . The RDD allows us to remove the potential endogeneity of elections resulting from unmeasured 4 characteristics of states and candidates. Our main specification uses parametric regression discontinuity. We estimate the following equation: X st refers to time-varying state characteristics used in some specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the state level to account for potential serial correlation. We also present alternate polynomials and local-linear regression in the section 5, using optimal bandwidth choice by Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2012) .
Results

Graphical Evidence
As is customary in RD analysis, we first present some graphical evidence on the impact of Democratic governors on concentration levels for our outcomes of interest: carbon monoxide, ground-level ozone, nitrogen dioxide, particulate matter and sulfur dioxide. Figure I explore the discontinuity at 0% when a Democratic governor barely wins over a Republican.
In each graph, each dot represents the average outcome that follows election t, grouped Table 2 shows that Democratic governors significantly reduce concentrations for NO2, Ozone and
Main results
Particulates. Coefficients for CO and SO2 also suggest that Democratic governors reduce concentrations, although the results are not statistically significant. Table 3 investigate whether the concentrations of the substances are higher than recommended by EPA. Table 3 shows that under Democratic governors, it is less likely that ozone emission will exceed the limits. There is no significant difference for the rest of the substances (CO and particulate), and NO2 and SO2 never goes above the recommended limit. In summary, Table 2 and 3 both suggest that concentrations are lower under Democratic governors, although only the ozone limit is less likely to be met under Democratic governors.
Although Democratic governors mostly affect concentrations of pollutants for levels in accordance with the EPA standards, the impacts on health may still be important. In particular for Ozone and Particulates, the EPA standards are significantly weaker than the guidelines suggested by the World Health Organization (WHO, see Table A. 3). As discussed in section 2.2, Ozone and Particulates are not directly emitted and are the result of complex interactions between many pollutants. This implies that pollution reduction is more challenging for those pollutants, and that they are therefore more prone to political manipulation (Potoski & Woods, 2002) . In the next section, we discuss how this section' results can be partly explained by state regulations. Table 4 , Table 5 and Table 6 investigate potential channels to explain the difference in pollution under Democratic governors. We concentrate on two main channels: policies and public spending on parks and recreation and natural resources.
The Impact of State Regulations
We expect the main channel to be through changes in policies. According to Potoski & Woods (2002) , changes in Air pollution regulations are strongly influenced by the political game, and by lobbies. By opposition, spending is more dependent on the complexity of the environmental problem and mainly goes through bureaucracies, which are likely to be less influenced by changes in the governor's party affiliation.
As discussed in section 2.2, a likely contributor to the decrease in the measured concentrations of pollutants is the Clean Air Act, established in 1970 and revised in 1977 and 1990 . State level implementations of the Clean Air Act differ substantially across states (again, see section 2.2). We argue that those differences are, at least partly, sourced in the political game between Democrats and Republicans.
We will focus on the trading systems for the nitrogen dioxide and the sulfur dioxide as they are widely recognized to have significantly impacted the concentrations of those two pollutants (Burtraw & Szambelan, 2009) . Figures 5 and 6 present the differences in average concentration levels for states participating or not in the trading programs. 4 We see that, for both pollutants, those trading programs have been implemented in states with relatively high levels of pollutants. The impact, however, seems to be much stronger for SO2. One of the possible explanations is that there were far fewer changes to the program's regulation for SO2 than for NO2. We include those changes as controls in our RD regressions. Specifically, we add a dummy variable for the states involved in those trading programs as well as for 4 Note that the trading program started in 1995 for SO2 and in 1990 for NO2.
7 major changes in those programs. Table 4 replicates the results of Table 2 while including additional controls for the policies discussed above. The coefficient for Democratic governors is no longer significant, which suggests that policies are a main channel through which we observe the decrease in pollution under Democratic governors. This is in accordance with Ines and Mitra (2015). Table 6 replicates the results of Table 2 and includes additional controls for spending on parks and recreation and natural resources, but no policy controls. Results are similar to Table 2 and show a significant decrease for ozone and particulates. 5 Table 5 control for policies and spending on parks and recreation and natural resources. Results are similar to table 2 and not significant. Table 4 , 5 and 6 suggest that the main channel through which governors affect pollution is the implemented policies. Although controlling for spending of parks and recreation and natural resources adds noise to the estimates, the estimated coefficient is only marginaly affected. By opposition, controlling for changes in policies have a strong downside impact on the magnitude of the coefficient. This interpretation is also supported by the fact that we found little impact of the political game on the probability that a state met the exceedance levels. Indeed, violation of the primary exceedance levels is small, and relatively homogeneous across states and time. This suggests that the politico-environmental game happens for relatively low levels of concentration, i.e. in accordance with federal regulation.
Robustness and Different samples
We investigate the validity of the RD methodology in our context. We first look at the density of the elections around the cutoff. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the margin of victory (MV) for Democrats across all elections in our sample. The distribution is clustered around the cutoff point with no unusual jumps. Figure 3 presents Second, we investigate the robustness of the results to alternate polynomials. Following Lee & Lemieux (2014) , we verify that our results are similar using first and third degree polynomials. Results presented in Table 8 and Table 9 show that results are quite similar regardless of the order of the polynomials used. We also present local linear regression discontinuity, using optimal procedure by Imbens & Kalyanaraman (2012) . Results presented in Table 7 also show that Democratic governors decrease pollution levels.
Third, we run a placebo RDD, using outcomes in the previous term to remove concerns of the persistence of results. One concern is that the decrease in concentrations found above could result from long term trends. To remove this concern, we use concentration data in the previous term as an outcome and run placebo RD test. We find that there is no discontinuity in concentration outcomes in the year prior to the election (T-1), which imparts confidence in the RDD. Results are presented in Table 10 . Table A .1. The analysis using this subsample yields qualitatively the same conclusion: Democrats decrease air pollution. Appendix Table A .2 presents results when governors and state legislatures are of the same party (united government); one 6 We also investigate whether campaign spending by Democrats across states in close elections differs from that by Republicans (Caughey and Sekhon (2011) ). Using data from Jensen & Beyle (2003) , we find no evidence for this. Furthermore, for close elections to be regarded as fully random, the elections won by Democratic governors should not be more likely to come with a Democratic legislature. We checked and confirmed that those variables are not statistically different when Democrats barely won. might argue that party affiliation plays a more important role in such a case. Results of Table A .2 point all to the same conclusion: Democratic governors decrease air pollution. 7
These additional robustness checks provide confidence that Democratic governors have a significant impact on air quality.
Conclusion
In this paper, we found a significant causal impact of party allegiance on the realized levels of air pollution for nitrogen dioxide, ground-Level Ozone and particulate matters.
Conformably to the literature, we find that the causal effect of governors are likely sourced in the parties' chosen policies. We contribute to the literature by showing that political party in power have measurable impacts on the realized levels of pollutants. This is an important issue because of the well documented link between air pollution and health.
An interesting finding is that the effect mostly happens for relatively low levels of pollution, i.e. below the national standards. This suggests that national regulations, such as the EPA standards, are effective not only in reducing pollution, but also in tempering the political power play between Republican and Democratic governors. 
